Active directory trust relationship issues with kids

Active Directory Trusts – Ace Fekay

active directory trust relationship issues with kids

or NTLM, Created automatically when a child domain is added. The trust path is the series of domain trust relationships that the authentication process must . then issues the workstation a TGT for the domain. A forest trust relationship between the two organizations Active Directory Parent – Child trust relationship to access resources in the trusting domain. . An old post but if anyone stumbles onto it to resolve Steve's issue you. Im having troubles with a parent-child trust relationship. I have I root domain and 3 child domains, relationships with 2 child domains are.

I have also seen arguments where certain applications here is an example that are performing logon routines are not able to query a forest, and therefore need a direct trust. There is likely a newer version of the application without this requirement. If there is not an update or competitive product without this requirement, then it is time to do some soul searching on what is more important. The crux of the issue is different technologies providing the trust path between the same domains, each having different characteristics and limitations.

One workflow may use the enumeration of trusted domains and hit one of these limitations based on the technology invoked. This is true regardless of traversing a trust, or in the local domain.

This article talks about this behavior, although it is not that straight forward about why it is a problem. When accessing a resource using Kerberos Authentication, the client has to construct a Service Principal Name based on the Host Name offering that service.

active directory trust relationship issues with kids

Take a look at the example Below: Here we have a File Server FileServ1. In Vista and SMBv2: This will avoid a variety of headaches because you could see unexpected outcomes as you use other network transports like HTTP. Use Fully Qualified Domain Names: When joining a domain, writing logon scripts, or configuring an application setting that requires a computer or domain name, I have just made this a habit ever since about There are plenty of ways that Windows can overcome flat names, but why not keep it simple wherever you can.

AD Child Trust relationship failed after seize fsmo roles

After diving into group scopingI realized a few subtle misconceptions I previously had concerning trusts and group memberships. That, combined with the changes made to PowerView last yearconvinced me to publish an up-to-date guide on enumerating and attacking domain trusts. I had a number of fuzzy misconceptions regarding domain trusts when I started writing about them. So I am going to start fresh, in case you are not familiar with the previous posts I pushed out about trusts.

As such, a few parts of this post will recycle certain elements and wording from previous work, integrated with updated knowledge and PowerView syntax. At a high level, a domain trust establishes the ability for users in one domain to authenticate to resources or act as a security principal in another domain.

  • Your Answer
  • Transitive Trust
  • Trust Flow: Transitive vs. Non-Transitive

Domain forests are collections of domain containers that trust each other. Forests themselves may also have trusts between them. Microsoft has excellent post about how domain and forest trusts work. Essentially, all a trust does is link up the authentication systems of two domains and allows authentication traffic to flow between them through a system of referrals.

active directory trust relationship issues with kids

This enables the ticket-granting service in each domain to treat the one in the other domain as just another service providing cross-domain service access for resources in the other domain. The purpose of establishing a trust is to allow users from one domain to access resources like the local Administrators group on a serverto be nested in groups, or to otherwise be used as security principals in another domain e.

One exception to this is intra-forest trusts domain trusts that exist within the same Active Directory forest - any domain created within a forest retains an implicit two-way, transitive trust relationship with every other domain in the forest.

This has numerous implications which will be covered later in this post. But before that, we have to cover a few more characteristics of trusts. There are several types of trusts, some of which have various offensive implications, covered in a bit: Normally referrals in a complex forest have to filter up to the forest root and then back down to the target domain, so for a geographically spread out scenario, cross-links can make sense to cut down on authentication times.

External — an implicitly non-transitive trust created between disparate domains. These are intra-forest trusts, and they preserve two-way transitivity while allowing the tree to have a separate domain name instead of child.

Forest — a transitive trust between one forest root domain and another forest root domain. Forest trusts also enforce SID filtering. I hope to dive more into MIT trusts in the future. Another aspect of domain trusts is that they are transitive or non-transitive. To quote the MSDN documentation on transitivity: Also, trusts can be one-way or two-way. A bidirectional two-way trust is actually just two one-way trusts.

Trust Relationship Between Server 2012 R2

A one-way trust means users and computers in a trusted domain can potentially access resources in another trusting domain. A one-way trust is in one direction only, hence the name. Users and computers in the trusting domain can not access resources in the trusted domain. Microsoft has a nice diagram to visualize this: But really, why care? Domain trusts often introduce unintended access paths between environments.

Because historically there have not been many toolsets that allow you to easily map, enumerate, and visualize the risk associated with misconfigured trusts, many domain architects are unaware of the unintentional risk exposed by their Active Directory trust architectures.

This also introduces opportunities for persistence- why leave code running in a secured environment, when you can have implants running in the less-secured but trusted domain that can then be used to re-compromise your target at will? A Trust Attack Strategy Before we get into the technical details of how to enumerate and abuse trusts, I wanted to go over the high level strategy I use when auditing trust relationships.

Basically, you want to produce a mapping of all the domains you can reach from your current context through the linking of trust referrals. This will allow you to determine the domains you need to hop through to get to your target and what techniques you can execute to possibly achieve this. Another subnote- as mentioned, Kerberoasting across trusts may be another vector to hop a trust boundary. Check out the Another Sidenote: Kerberoasting Across Domain Trusts section for more information.

At a minimum, remember that if a domain trusts you, i. How do I go about figuring out what trust relationships exist in my environment? As far as I know, there are three main methods to enumerate trusts: Win32 API calls, various. Each one frustratingly returns a differing set of information, and each one has different execution methods.

Top Ten Issues with Active Directory Trusts and Corporate Mergers

This image was generated with the new TrustVisualizer output described in the Visualizing Domain Trusts section. NET provides us with some nice method wrappers that can enumerate a good chunk of domain and forest trust information. I recently changed the default method to be LDAP, as this. Forest trusts are functionally different than domain trusts.

While the information is a bit more complex than the. The flags are documented here and will tell you the trust direction, whether the trust is within the same forest, etc.

active directory trust relationship issues with kids

Of note, this appears to be what nltest. This is also the method that BloodHound uses to enumerate domain trusts. You can execute this with the new SharpHound. Also, if a trust is non-transitive, then you will not be able to query any Active Directory information from trusts up the chain from the non-transitive point.

External trusts are implicitly non-transitive. This is a bit of a weird one. For more information, check out this MSDN doc.